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Abstract 
This article examines how Koreans became industrial workers in the first and second phases of 
industrialisation on the peninsula: under Japanese colonial rule, 1931-1945, and under the DPRK's 
post-Korean War heavy industrialisation, 1953-1960. While the political regimes of the Japanese 
colony and postcolonial DPRK were different, industrialisation occurred under similar conditions, 
characterised principally by war, state capitalism and imperialism. Processes of proletarianisation 
also reveal similarities in the two periods, including the widespread use of forced mobilisation and 
immobilisation of workers and a bureaucratic apparatus supporting close control of labour. This 
article contributes to the critique of conventional views about the role of 'free wage labour' during 
the transition to capitalism. 
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1. Introduction 
 
During the twentieth century the Korean peninsula saw three major phases of industrialisation and 
proletarianisation, each under very different political regimes. The first occurred in the mid to late 
1930s under colonial rule as the Japanese empire made northern Korea a forward operating base for 
its invasion of China. The second was also focused in northern Korea during the post-Korean War 
period, as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea reconstructed its shattered economy and 
attempted to emulate Stalin's heavy-industry-first policy. The third – and best known – phase 
occurred in South Korea, beginning in the mid 1960s. Previous work on development on the Korean 
peninsula has focused almost exclusively on this last phase and the story of South Korea's rapid rise 
as an 'Asian Tiger', exceptionalising its development as a 'miracle'.i This paper will instead examine 
the first two phases of Korean development to find out what can be learnt about the character of 
industrialisation and proletarianisation in mid-twentieth century East Asia. It will ask the question: 
how did Korean peasants become workers in the mid-twentieth century? We might assume that the 
answer to this question is straightforward, but even a cursory examination of the history of the last 
200 years shows that the way people have become workers has varied enormously according to time 
and place. 
While the story of North Korea's economic development has been largely overlooked, studies that 
cross the colonial/postcolonial divide in modern Korean history are even more unusual. 
Approaching the problem of Korean proletarianisation through a transhistorical study of colonial 
and postcolonial northern Korea has some potential benefits for our understanding of Third World 
proletarianisation more generally. First, we can easily compare colonial and postcolonial regimes of 
industrialisation that were separated by only a short period of time. Second, we can examine two 
cases in which the state played a particularly clear role in proletarianisation. And third, we can 
consider the effects of two major wars on the processes of industrialisation and class formation. To 
summarise: although the political regimes of the Japanese colonial state and the postcolonial DPRK 
state were very different, industrialisation during these two periods occurred under similar 
conditions, characterised principally by war, imperialism and state capitalism. Similarities in 
processes of proletarianisation are therefore also apparent, with a strong tendency toward the forced 
mobilisation of workers to alleviate labour shortages in new industries or industries that were 
considered strategically important for war or postwar reconstruction. Likewise, under conditions of 
high-speed state capitalist development, workers were uprooted suddenly from their rural 
environments and thrown into dangerous industrial conditions of which they had no previous 
experience. Resistance to this in both periods often took the form of high worker mobility, which 
was countered by the state in the form of strong labour discipline and legal sanctions against 
moving workplace that pushed conditions for workers towards the unfree end of the wage labour 
spectrum. In the colonial period the new working class also created strong labour movements, but 
for various reasons this form of resistance was not repeated in the 1950s.ii 
 
2. Proletarianisation and Global Labour History 
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Research on proletarianisation in the twentieth century, particularly in the newly emerging field of 
'global labour history', has recognised that the process of class formation has not followed a 
classical model laid down by England or other western European countries. This research has also 
shown that forcible mobilisation played a major part in the proletarianisation of peasants in many 
parts of the world. But as yet there has been little attention paid to the role of the state and war in 
this process. In particular, the process of proletarianisation in countries where the state either 
directed or completely dominated the national economy has been overlooked. In the following I will 
look briefly at how a number of historians and theorists from Marx onwards have approached the 
issue of proletarianisation outside of Europe. 
As is well known, Karl Marx defined the working class created by capitalism as a class that was 
'free' in two senses: “neither they themselves form part and parcel of the means of production, as in 
the case of slaves, bondsmen, etc., nor do the means of production belong to them, as in the case of 
peasant-proprietors.”iii In other words, they are both free to sell their labour to an employer and free 
from owning significant means of production. Thus for Marx the process of proletarianisation is  
also a double one: of emancipating workers from the bonds of precapitalist societies (slavery, 
serfdom, guilds) and at the same time of “divorcing the producer from the means of production.” 
Marx is quite clear that this is not a positive story of liberation, as liberal historians would have it, 
but rather a story of expropriation, “written in the annals of mankind in letters of blood and fire.”iv 
In chapter 27 of Capital I, Marx goes on to describe the 'classical' form that this expropriation took 
in England, from the enclosure of agricultural land for sheep grazing, to the appropriation of church, 
crown and common land by private landowners, to the clearances of great estates. This process 
created a ready-made army of workers for the new industries of the towns and cities of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, creating the conditions in which the worker is subjugated to 
the capitalist by the “dull compulsion of economic relations.”v 
However, from the start, Marx recognised that this particular English experience of 
proletarianisation would not necessarily be the model for all others that would surely follow as 
capitalism spread around the globe. He writes for example, that the “history of this expropriation, in 
different countries, assumes different aspects, and runs through its various phases in different orders 
of succession, and at different periods.”vi He also recognised that, while the economic relations of 
nascent capitalism appeared to the worker as “self-evident laws of Nature”,vii coercion, and 
particularly state-backed coercion, were still a key element of capitalist relations of production and 
the process of proletarianisation: 
Direct force, outside economic conditions, is of course still used, but only exceptionally. 
In the ordinary run of things, the labourer can be left to the “natural laws of production,” 
.... It is otherwise during the historic genesis of capitalist production. The bourgeoisie, at 
its rise, wants and uses the power of the state to “regulate” wages, i.e., to force them 
within the limits suitable for surplus value making, to lengthen the working day and to 
keep the labourer himself in the normal degree of dependence.viii 
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In one of the few books to consider the general phenomenon of twentieth century proletarianisation 
in the non-European world, Munslow and Finch have echoed Marx, arguing that “the experience of 
the Third World has not been, on the whole, simply a replication of the kind of proletarianisation 
that occurred in Britain and the other advanced capitalist countries, with the creation of a large-scale 
permanent proletariat, divorced from ownership of the means of production and thus totally 
dependent on the sale of its labour power for survival.”ix As they point out, proletarianisation in the 
'Third World' has been a very complex process that has not necessarily created a new working class 
around the world that looks like the old working class of Britain and western Europe. Munslow and 
Finch point in particular to two features of proletarianisation under conditions of late development: 
labour scarcity and extra-economic coercion.x Their book offers a number of case studies that 
demonstrate the importance of forced labour mobilisation as a means of dealing with the labour 
supply problem, and, as they point out, such forced labour lasted until the 1920s in the British 
colonies, until the end of WWII in the French colonies and until 1961 in the Portuguese colonies.xi 
This sort of mobilisation could be carried out either by the state or by private capitalists, but 
Munslow and Finch are clear about the importance of the state in Third World proletarianisation, 
noting “the role of the state in accelerating the proletarianisation process, for example by land 
annexation, taxation or the introduction of forced labour obligations.”xii 
It might be expected therefore that the role of extra-economic coercion and the capitalist state in the 
process of proletarianisation have been universally recognised by Marxist analyses. However, there 
is a long-running debate about the nature of Marx's notion of 'free wage labour' and whether a 
proletarian can also be subject to extra-economic coercion, or indeed whether slavery and other 
forms of unfree labour can be a 'normal' part of capitalist exploitation. Many previous works on 
proletarianisation have assumed that subsequent processes of working class formation would follow 
that of England and that only truly 'free' wage labourers could be true proletarians.xiii In response to 
this, recent work by Van der Linden has argued that Marx himself was wrong to believe that labour 
power under capitalism could only be commodified through free wage labour (“as a free individual 
[who] can dispose of his labour-power as his own commodity”). He argues instead that the history 
of proletarianisation beyond the North Atlantic region shows that “in reality labour 
commodification takes many different forms, of which the free wage-earner only selling his or her 
own labour power is only one example.”xiv He goes on to argue that “there is an almost endless 
variety of producers in capitalism, and the intermediate forms between the different categories are 
fluid rather than sharply defined.”xv As Van der Linden points out, besides outright chattel slavery, 
there are in fact many ways in which wage workers can be tied to their employers.xvi 
However, whether Van der Linden's charges against Marx are entirely justified is another matter. As 
Banaji has pointed out in his essay, “The Fictions of Free Labour: Contract, Coercion, and so-called 
Unfree Labour”, Marx was fully aware that his conception of free wage labour did not mean that 
workers under capitalism were free from extra-economic coercion. In fact, Banaji argues, it is 
impossible under capitalism to clearly draw a line between freedom and coercion.xvii Banaji terms 
the idea that wage labour under capitalism is based on a freely-made contract between worker and 
employer the “liberal-individualist notion of wage-labour”.xviii  In reality, 
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...employers have repeatedly subjected free workers to repressive forms of control. The 
massive deployment of Polish seasonal labourers on the East Elbian estates during the 
First World War and under Nazism, the forced recruitment of wage-labourers in French 
and British Africa, and the position of nineteenth-century English wage-earners who 
faced criminal sanctions for breach of contract all exemplify situations where the 
„boundary between compulsion and free will...was neither distinct nor of any great 
interest‟ to the authorities and employers.xix 
 
Thus for Banaji, “at the level of individual capitals, it is accumulation... that defines capitalism, not 
the presence or absence of 'free' labour,” and capital accumulation actually works through “a 
multiplicity of forms of exploitation based on wage labour.”xx Marx did understand that as 
proletarianisation spread around the world it would take quite different forms and may involve 
varying degrees of unfreedom. However, subsequent history has shown just how varied and uneven 
the process would be, and the extent to which capitalism would rely for certain periods on forced 
labour. 
While the authors discussed above do at least mention the role of the state in proletarianisation, only 
Munslow and Finch have analysed its role as a key agent of the process. Thus, one of the aims of 
this study will be to do just that by examining the role of state-led labour mobilisation in mid- 
twentieth century processes of Korean proletarianisation. A second aspect, again rarely mentioned in 
the literature outlined above, is the role of war, specifically as a period during which the capitalist 
state enhances all its powers and becomes hyperactive.xxi 
The analysis of the Korean case presented in this article will be based on an important theoretical 
proposition: that both Korea under Japanese colonial rule and the postcolonial Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea were capitalist societies. While their political regimes appear to have been 
diametrically opposed, this masks the fact that both represented forms of state capitalist political 
economy.xxii By state capitalist here I mean societies in which the state either wholly or 
predominantly took on the task of capital accumulation, acting as a huge capitalist enterprise. This 
global tendency of early- and mid-twentieth-century capitalism was taken to its extreme form by the 
countries of the Soviet bloc – including the DPRK – where all (or almost all) private capital 
accumulation was abolished and a bureaucracy completely replaced the private capitalist class, a 
form referred to by Cliff as “bureaucratic state capitalism”.xxiii However, the internal logic of 
capitalism, determined by the capital-wage labour relation and the drive for competitive 
accumulation, remained. During the high period of state capitalism in the mid-twentieth century, 
military competition between blocs mostly replaced economic competition between capitals as the 
driver of accumulation for the countries of the Soviet bloc, but the same tendency was present to a 
lesser degree in other countries too.xxiv 
Since state capitalism often means that workers are directly exploited and controlled by the state, it 
has important implications for the wage labour debate and proletarianisation. The forced 
mobilisation of workers and limitations on their mobility by the state do not negate Marx's notion of 
capitalist relations of production based on wage labour, but rather represent one of the forms that 
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capitalist wage labour can take, especially in the process of initial industrialisation and 
proletarianisation, and/or in times of war. Rather than a dichotomy of free and unfree labour, this 
view sees wage labour under capitalism as existing on a spectrum from relatively free to relatively 
unfree. Just as under bureaucratic state capitalism the competition between many capitals is 
displaced from the sub-national level but the competitive drive to accumulate is maintained through 
inter-state and inter-bloc competition,xxv under forms of state capitalism the labour market is 
partially or wholly displaced but the fundamental wage labour-capital relation remains as the means 
by which capital is accumulated.xxvi 
The following section of this article will describe in outline the industrialisation of the northern 
region of Korea between the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 and the completion of the 
DPRK's first five-year plan in 1961. Sections 4 and 5 will then look in detail at the question of 
proletarianisation, treating the periods of late colonial rule (1931-1945) and wartime and post-war 
DPRK (1945-1961) in separate sections. 
 
3. The industrialisation of northern Korea under colonial and postcolonial regimes, 1931-1961 
 
Japan began its drive to industrialise Korea in the early 1930s under Governor-General Ugaki 
Kazushige. Close cooperation between the Japanese Government-General in Korea and Japanese 
conglomerates such as Noguchi Jun's Chisso had already begun to take shape in the late 1920s with 
the planning of huge hydroelectric dams on the Yalu River and the building of Chisso's enormous 
chemical plant and company town at Hŭngnam on the east coast of northern Korea. However, it was 
Japan's expansion into Manchuria in 1931 that really served as impetus for industrialising northern 
Korea and integrating it into the newly-gained colonial territories of northeastern China.xxvii 
Before turning to the scale and character of this industrialisation drive, it is necessary to note the 
situation of the Korean working class prior to 1931. Large-scale proletarianisation had actually 
begun in Korea (or the Japanese colony of Chōsen as it was then known) not long after annexation 
with the land survey carried out by the Japanese between 1910 and 1918. This survey helped to 
enlarge the landholdings of large landlords and dispossess smallholder peasants, increasing the 
floating population of landless and destitute peasants. This led, in the 1920s, to the growth of a 
significant population of wage workers, concentrated especially in the informal sector, but also 
employed in emerging light industries such as textiles and rubber.xxviii In 1930 Korea was still an 
overwhelmingly agricultural country where some 80 percent of the adult male population were 
employed in farming. However, out of a total population of 21 million, 1.16 million were classified 
as urban wage workers by the Government-General and of these 40.4 percent were day labourers, 
27.6 percent were domestic servants while only 3.4 percent were factory workers and 2 percent 
miners.xxix Thus Korea at the time had the sort of small and largely informal working class often 
seen as typical of colonised countries or postcolonial societies that have yet to achieve significant 
industrialisation. 
8 
This is the accepted version of an article published by Taylor and Francis in Third World Quarterly, Vol.37 (10), 1901-1920. 
Please refer to the published version when citing: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2016.1171707  
Accepted Version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/22708/ 
 
 
 
 
9 
This is the accepted version of an article published by Taylor and Francis in Third World Quarterly, Vol.37 (10), 1901-1920. 
Please refer to the published version when citing: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2016.1171707  
Accepted Version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/22708/ 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Structure of the Korean urban working class in 1930 
 
Category of worker Population 
(Total population in 1930: 21 million) 
Day-labourers 
(porters, transport workers etc) 
468,000 (40.4%) 
Domestic servants 
(maids and houseboys) 
319,000 (27.6) 
Factory workers 
(concentrated in food processing) 
40,000 (3.4%) 
Mineworkers 23,000 (2%) 
Other 310,000 (26.6%) 
Total urban wage workers 1,160,000 
Source: Park, “Colonial Industrial Growth and the Working Class,” 134. 
 
 
In the early to mid 1930s, large industrial complexes began to be established in the northern part of 
the Korean peninsula, alongside an expansion of light industries such as textiles and rubber. Such 
complexes included the aforementioned Hŭngnam chemical works and the Ch'ŏngjin Iron Works 
established by Mitsubishi further up the east coast. Overall, the 1930s saw a major change in the 
structure of Korean industry, with a shift in the ratio of light to heavy industry from 79.3 percent vs 
20.7 percent in 1930 to a situation in 1943 where production in each sector was about equal at 50.5 
percent to 49.5 percent respectively.xxx 
The results of this period of rapid industrialisation in terms of proletarianisation were clear.  
Between 1933 and 1943 the industrial working class employed in factories, mines, transportation 
and construction grew from around 200,000 to 1.22 million workers and by 1943 workers in these 
sectors made up 70 percent of the working class as a whole.xxxi Along with this proletarianisation 
came mass migrations of Koreans to new places of work, principally from the agricultural south of 
the country to the industrialising northern provinces of Pyŏng'an and Hamgyŏng, as well as the 
industrial centres of the centre and south: Seoul-Inch'ŏn and Pusan.xxxii Other features of the growth 
and transformation of Korea's working class during this period included the increasing 
concentration of workers in larger workplaces, the increasing masculinisation of the workforce,xxxiii 
and a decreasing proportion of Japanese workers in Korean factories.xxxiv  It should also be noted 
that the figures quoted above do not encompass the entirety of Korean proletarianisation since in the 
1930s many Koreans migrated to Japan and Manchuria to become industrial workers there and that 
trend would be further extended once the Japanese empire had entered a total war footing in the late 
1930s and early 1940s. 
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Table 2: Growth of the Korean industrial working class under Japan's industrialisation 
policy, 1933-1943 
 
Category of worker 1933 1943 
Factory workers 99,400 390,000 
Mineworkers 70,700 280,000 
Transportation workers n/a 170,000 
Construction workers 43,600 380,000 
Miscellaneous n/a 530,000 
Total n/a 1,750,000 
Source: Park, “Colonial Industrial Growth and the Working Class,” 140. 
 
 
 
In August 1945 as the Japanese surrendered, the northern half of the Korean peninsula was occupied 
by the Soviet army which set about installing a friendly government under Kim Il Sung. This 
emerging state under Soviet tutelage inherited 65 percent of Korea's heavy industry, taking over 
Japanese factories and industrial complexes wholesale and formally nationalising them in 1946.xxxv 
Also in the spring of 1946 the nascent North Korean state carried out a sweeping land reform that 
almost completely dispossessed former Japanese and Korean landlords, creating a small 
independent peasant economy overnight.xxxvi  In the late 1940s North Korean industry faced 
problems due to the legacy of the recent war and the division of the peninsula into two hostile states, 
including the fact that this period saw a significant reversal of the south-north migration of the 
1930s, with some 2 million Koreans moving across the 38th parallel from the north to the south. 
However, despite these problems the newly nationalised industries of the DPRK were able to 
recover and even achieve some growth before the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950.xxxvii 
The Korean War of 1950-1953 was absolutely devastating to the North Korean economy and to its 
industrial facilities in particular, which sustained continuous aerial bombardment by the US Air 
Force for much of the three years. A large proportion of North Korean industry was moved 
underground in order to continue operating and valuable plant was moved across the border into 
northern China so that it could be preserved. Although parts of the industrial base were saved in this 
way, most modern buildings in urban and industrial areas were flattened and so postwar 
reconstruction meant a literal rebuilding of the built environment of the whole country.xxxviii This 
programme of reconstruction, which began as soon as the war ended in the summer of 1953, was 
supported by a huge injection of money, materials and manpower from the USSR, its Eastern 
European satellites, and the PRC, which kept its troops in the country until 1958, partly in order to 
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aid with rebuilding.xxxix But while the Three-Year Plan of 1954-1956 remained focused on 
reconstruction, the Five-Year Plan of 1957-1961xl was much more ambitious, as Kim Il Sung 
pursued a policy of headlong heavy industrialisation. In doing this he was following what had been, 
until the mid-1950s, the normal economic policy of both the USSR and its satellites, emphasising 
the all-round development of the national economy.xli At the same time, the DPRK pursued a very 
rapid collectivisation of the agricultural sector, which was completed in 1958, leaving no 
independent peasant households in the entire country. In terms of extensive growth, the 
industrialisation drive was successful, with average annual GNI growth of 16.6 percent in the period 
1953-1967, while annual growth rates in the late 1950s reached well over 20 percent.xlii Using the 
industrial frameworkxliii left behind by Japanese colonial development, a huge transfer of capital and 
technology from the USSR and Eastern Europe and the labour power of newly-proletarianised North 
Korean workers, the DPRK was able to catapult itself into the position of being the most 
industrialised East Asian nation aside from Japan by the 1960s. 
This inevitably meant a massive expansion of the North Korean working class in both the industrial 
and non-industrial sectors. According to official DPRK figures, the total number of employees in 
the economy increased from 565,000 in 1953 to 1.45 million in 1960, out of a total population of 
10.78 million.xliv The increase for industryxlv alone was from 165,000xlvi immediately following the 
Korean War to 699,000 in 1960, and including workers in transportation, communications and 
construction gives an increase for the broader non-rural working class from 318,000 to 954,000. 
Meanwhile, during the same period the proportion of all employees in industry (as opposed to 
agriculture, transport, construction and so on) rose from 29.2 percent to 48.2 percent.xlvii This new 
industrial working class was still concentrated in the areas that had begun to be industrialised in the 
1930s: Pyongyang (246,000 employees in 1960), the surrounding province of South P'yŏngan 
(200,000 employees), and the North and South Hamgyŏng Provinces (a total of 343,000 
employees).xlviii 
 
 
Table 3: Number of employees in various branches of the DPRK economy, 1946-1960 
 
Branch of 
productio
n 
1946 1949 1953 1956 1959 1960 
Industry 155,000 245,000 165,000 294,000 649,000 699,000 
Agriculture 
(Only those employed on 
state farms) 
- 17,000 57,000 54,000 87,000 97,000 
Transportation - - 49,000 55,000 68,000 72,000 
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Communication - - 13,000 13,000 14,000 15,000 
Capital construction - 82,000 91,000 132,000 195,000 168,000 
Trade - 25,000 17,000 36,000 85,000 81,000 
Non-
production 
branches 
63,000 131,000 171,000 172,000 185,000 173,000 
Source: Statistical Returns of National Economy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 1946-1960, 125. 
 
 
Immediately after liberation most new workers in North Korea were poor peasants attracted by new 
opportunities in industry, but they were also joined by those who had lost out in the land reforms of 
1946: former landlords, middling peasants, merchants and so on. After the Korean War the labour 
supply suffered from severe restrictions while demand for labour skyrocketed and the state had to 
find new ways to achieve its ambitious expansion of the working class, a subject we will return to in 
section 5. 
 
4. The formation of the north Korean working class I: under colonial rule, 1931-1945 
 
As the industrialisation of Korea began in earnest in the early 1930s, labour scarcity quickly became 
a problem for the Japanese conglomerates like Chisso who were investing in the colony with the 
encouragement of the Government-General.xlix In the late 1920s and early 1930s it was specifically 
unskilled labourers that were needed on big projects like the building of hydroelectric dams and the 
Hŭngnam chemical complex. Initially industrial labour came voluntarily from the peasant class and 
the informal proletariat of the towns and cities. But by 1934 the problem had become acute enough 
for the Government-General to step in and organise the first state-led labour recruitment programme 
in April of that year. This was called the 'policy to transfer the surplus southern population to the 
northern provinces' (nansen kajō jinkō hokuisaku) and it was designed to encourage unskilled 
construction workers to migrate from the agricultural southern provinces (Ch'ungch'ŏng, Chŏlla, and 
Kyŏngsang) to the north of Korea where industrial development was focused.l However, until the 
late 1930s, there was no significant coercive mobilisation of workers by the state. During much of 
the 1930s Korea migrant labour continued to move freely around the peninsula, with workers going 
to the northern industrial areas for periods and then returning to their rural homes in the south. 
With the beginning of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937 and the intensification of Japan's colonial 
industrialisation programme, the Government-General introduced a series of larger and frequently 
coercive labour mobilisation programmes under the umbrella of the National General Mobilisation 
Law. According to Brandon Palmer there were three types of labour mobilisation introduced into 
Korea between 1938 and 1942: company-directed recruitment with state backing (boshū); 
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government-directed recruitment (kan assen); and labour conscription (chōyō). They were brought 
in in phases but also co-existed and shared some similar features with one another.li 
Under the company-directed recruitment system the Government-General gave companies quotas 
for numbers of workers they could recruit from certain areas. The Government-General also 
provided help with recruitment on the ground via police stations and government-run labour offices, 
which frequently took the form of pressure applied to young men and their families.lii However, it 
appears that this system was both expensive for companies and failed to recruit the required number 
of workers for Japanese industry. Thus the Japanese state turned to a more interventionist approach 
with the government-directed system, under which companies could request workers from the 
Government-General, which would in turn use employment agencies to fill the demands. Under this 
system recent graduates and skilled workers aged 18 to 40 were required to register with the 
government and the major employment agencies were nationalised. This system certainly increased 
the coerciveness of labour recruitment in colonial Korea, with county authorities ordering village 
heads to provide a certain number of young men for the recruiters. Between 1939 and 1945 a total 
of 402,053 Korean men were mobilised under government-directed recruitment to work in both 
Korea and Japan. Of these, the vast majority were recruited for construction, public works, 
shipyards and defensive fortifications (83 percent), with 10 percent going to mines and only 2.2 
percent to factories.liii So this type of mobilisation did not create a great many new factory workers 
and was mainly directed at providing large numbers of unskilled manual workers for wartime 
projects, replacing Japanese workers who had been mobilised for the military. 
The third and most coercive form of labour mobilisation – labour conscription – was introduced 
into the Korean colony in 1942, after the start of the Pacific War. As Brandon Palmer writes, 
“Conscription gave the government full control over all aspects of labour, including the power to 
bind workers to their jobs. Conscripted labourers were national employees and could not quit or 
change jobs without government permission.”liv Under this system there were two types of 
conscription: either workers could be recruited (coercively) for a job and fixed in that position for 
the period of a one or two-year contract, or they could be fixed in their existing job and forbidden 
from leaving. In fact, within Korea itself conscription usually took the latter form, with whole 
factories or mines having their workers frozen in position and unable to leave their jobs.lv Thus, 
conscription consisted of both forcible proletarianisation of men (and some women) from rural 
Korean villages and severe restrictions on the movement of workers; a major shift towards the 
unfree end of the wage labour spectrum in the context of war and labour shortages. During the 
lifetime of this system (1942-1945) Koreans were conscripted 526,042 times, with 43,679 being 
requisitioned to new workplaces within Korea and 260,145 being frozen to their positions, while 
another 222,082 were sent to work in Japan.lvi One other feature of labour mobilisation that is worth 
noting is the system of labour passports that the Japanese government established during the war. 
Under this system workers were issued with two passports, which were required to get a job. One 
would be held by the employer and the other kept by the worker, thus effectively preventing 
workers from moving from one workplace to another without the necessary permission.lvii 
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These state-led forms of labour recruitment were undoubtedly one of the main routes for 
proletarianisation during the latter part of the colonial period in Korea. Overall they recruited very 
large numbers of Koreans , with a total of 928,095 mobilisations under the government-directed 
and labour conscription systems. To this can be added the much larger number of men and women 
who were mobilised for temporary public works and construction projects by semi-official 
organisations such as the Patriotic Units (K: Aegukpan, J: Aikokuhan), amounting to a total of 
4,146,098 mobilisations in the period 1938-1945.lviii However, since there are no figures for the 
recruitment of workers by companies outside of these programmes, it is impossible to make a direct 
comparison of the numbers of Koreans who became workers via official routes as opposed to other 
routes that did not involve state intervention or wartime mobilisation. It is also necessary to bear in 
mind that alongside the role of the state, there were several other important factors pushing rural 
Koreans to move to industrial areas and get jobs in new industries. These included bad conditions in 
rural areas, especially during the years 1939-1942, as well as more personal factors such as a desire 
to leave an oppressive family or to get on in the world and take advantage of opportunities not 
available in rural Korea. 
Overall then, it is a fact that a large proportion of Koreans who became workers in the late colonial 
period did so via some form of state intervention and that the primary motivation for this 
intervention was mobilisation for war. A second conclusion is that during this period the process of 
proletarianisation had a decidedly coercive character, ranging from false enticements and social- 
moral pressure at one end to outright kidnapping of young Korean men at the most extreme end. 
Not only this, but the work which newly-recruited Korean workers performed was often far from 
the ideal of 'free wage labour', with severe restrictions on the movement of labour, strict labour 
discipline and other phenomena such as forced savings accounts into which workers had to place all 
their earnings.lix 
 
5. The formation of the North Korean working class II: under the DPRK, 1945-1961 
 
In a centralised, bureaucratic state capitalist society like that of the DPRK, where the state takes on 
the role of capital itself, it stands to reason that the state would be the primary agent in the process 
of proletarianisation. In fact from the early days of North Korea, even before the official founding 
of the DPRK in September 1948, it was the avowed aim of the state to proletarianise the whole of 
Korean society.lx The state did not simply pursue this aim in a passive way by carrying out its 
programme of industrialisation and waiting for new workers to sign up for jobs in factories or 
mines. From the beginning of the Korean War in June 1950 the DPRK state actively mobilised 
peasants and other sectors of society to become workers in order to overcome the severe labour 
shortages it faced. Labour shortages which were primarily caused by the war itself and its 
devastating aftermath. This demonstrates that the process of proletarianisation in North Korea had 
something in common with both 1930s colonial Korea and with the other Third World cases 
discussed by Munslow and Finch: labour supply was a key problem for industrialisation and one 
that had to be solved by extra-economic means. 
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In the early years between liberation in 1945 and the Korean War the North Korean economy and 
working class recovered from the ravages of WWII and the chaos that followed liberation, but 
neither expanded particularly rapidly. In 1947 the emerging North Korean state put in place its first 
one-year plan and by 1949 industrial output had recovered to its pre-liberation levels. Although the 
state needed recruit workers for its recovering industries, the land reform of 1946 made this difficult 
and as yet there were no attempts to mobilise new layers of workers on a mass scale.lxi  That 
changed drastically with the outbreak of the Korean War, which, like other wars, immediately 
caused both high demand for the production of certain goods and severe labour shortages as men of 
working age were mobilised for frontline fighting. In 1950 the number of industrial workers in 
North Korea dropped to 82 percent of the 1949 level, dropping further to 62 percent in 1951 before 
recovering slightly to 74 percent in 1952.lxii The DPRK state's answer to this problem was the mass 
mobilisation of most of the North Korean population for the war effort. Of most relevance here are 
two orders issued by the Military Affairs Commission (Kunsa wiwonhoe) in the first two months of 
the war: Order no. 6 “On wartime labour” (June 1950) and Order no. 23 “On wartime compulsory 
labour mobilisation” (July 1950). Labour mobilisation on the basis of these orders was carried out 
systematically by people's committees and party officials in each county, with the focus on 
mobilising women, peasants and even boys for work in factories, mines and other industrial 
facilities. In essence it was a form of labour conscription similar in some ways to the chōyō system 
used by the Japanese after 1942. Han Sŏng-hun cites the example of Yŏnch'ŏn County in Kangwon 
Province, where in the early months of the war 12,789 men and 14,812 women were mobilised for 
compulsory wartime labour duties.lxiii Han also emphasises the way in which the war served as a 
means of bringing large numbers of women into the industrial workforce and completely changing 
their attitudes towards wage labour. In the first three months of the war alone 31,366 women joined 
the industrial workforce in factories and other enterprises. This influx continued throughout the war, 
with – for example – some 19,000 women being recruited to work in the factories of North 
Hamgyŏng Province in June 1951.lxiv 
Although wartime mobilisation had proletarianised many Korean peasants and women and provided 
a solution for the immediate problem of maintaining production in wartime, it could not overcome 
the underlying loss of able-bodied and skilled workers to the war. Further causes of the postwar 
labour shortage were the high demand for labour stemming first from basic reconstruction and then 
from the heavy industrialisation drive of the five-year plan (1957-1961), and the problem of labour 
hoarding by enterprises who wanted to keep workers even when they didn't immediately need their 
labour power.lxv The influx of new workers also brought with it new problems, including a 
slackening of labour discipline among the workforce and a high level of labour mobility as many 
workers left their workplaces or switched jobs on a regular basis. Thus, after the armistice in July 
1953, the North Korean state was faced with a continuing severe labour shortage and a chaotic 
situation in the factories.lxvi 
In order to solve the labour shortage problem the DPRK state by and large continued its wartime 
mass mobilisation policy into the postwar period. Once the multi-year plans were in operation from 
1954, the State Planning Commission would centrally calculate the number of workers required in 
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each sector of the economy and then the Ministry of Labour would assign the workers to individual 
enterprises. At the lower level the workers were assigned to their workplaces by the labour 
department of the local People's Committee (PC).lxvii After the war most new workers entering 
factories and other industrial work were actually discharged soldiers, so in a sense the wartime troop 
mobilisation transitioned straight into peacetime labour mobilisation: rather than returning to their 
villages demobbed soldiers were assigned to workplaces. A second large group of new workers 
came from the peasant class, who were presumably mobilised by PCs on the orders of the Ministry 
of Labour. This process must have been aided by the programme of agricultural collectivisation that 
began in earnest in 1954 and was completed by the end of 1958. Although hard data on this is not 
currently available, it has been suggested that the combination of small independent farms into large 
collective farms and the beginnings of mechanisation in the countryside during the mid-1950s 
helped to create a surplus rural population that the state could channel into industrial production.lxviii 
Other smaller groups who provided workers for the postwar reconstruction and industrialisation 
drive included handicraftsmen, petty traders (whose businesses had usually been lost during the 
war) and young people newly graduated from school.lxix 
Besides discharged soldiers, women and the surplus peasant population, the DPRK state had some 
other sources of labour in the mid-1950s, especially during the Three-Year Plan focusing on 
reconstruction when large quantities of unskilled labour were required in the construction sector. 
One such source was the student and office worker population of the capital and other urban areas 
who were organised into 'volunteer' work brigades during holiday periods in order to speed up 
construction.lxx Another source of labour for reconstruction was the Chinese People's Volunteer 
Army, which remained stationed in North Korea in large numbers until 1958. There was clearly an 
understanding between the DPRK and People's Republic of China governments that the labour of 
the troops stationed in North Korea would constitute a large part of China's fraternal aid to its war- 
stricken ally and it seems that Chinese soldiers from the PRC were particularly put to work in rural 
areas to help re-start agricultural production.lxxi No doubt in the early years of postwar 
reconstruction, when skilled and experienced workers were not so essential (because many factories 
were not even running yet) and the level of mechanisation was low, these sources of labour were 
very useful for the DPRK state. 
We know that in the postwar period North Korean workers continued to be assigned to their 
workplaces by the state rather than participating in a labour market as such, but what of their 
situation once they were working in a factory, mine or other workplace? As noted above, at the end 
of the war the state faced a situation of flux in the industrial sector with very high rates of labour 
mobility as well as many new workers with little or no experience in a modern, industrial 
workplace. The state had begun to tackle this problem during wartime with the Military Affairs 
Commission orders mentioned above that prohibited workers from leaving their workplace of their 
own volition and made absence without leave a criminal offence. Far from relaxing these 
regulations after the armistice, in the immediate postwar period the DPRK government wrote them 
into law with the August 31, 1953 Supreme People's Assembly ordinance entitled: “On the 
prohibition of labourers and office workers from leaving their workplaces of their own accord”. 
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This ordinance stated clearly that “workers who intend to leave their workplace or move to another 
workplace must get permission from the workplace manager” and “those who intentionally leave 
their workplace must be brought to trial and can be sentenced to between 6 months and one year of 
reformative labour by the People's Court.”lxxii These restrictions on the movement of workers were 
enforced through a system of labour passports (rodong such'ŏp) and worker registers (roryŏk 
taejang) which were kept by each enterprise, rather similar to those used by the Japanese in the 
early 1940s. Not only did the enterprise record information about all workers in its worker register, 
it was also required to investigate a worker's labour passport for five days when hiring a new 
worker. North Korea's newly proletarianised workers were therefore tied to their workplace and 
highly dependent on their factory or enterprise manager.lxxiii 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
As the discussions above illustrate, there were significant similarities between the processes of 
proletarianisation that took place in colonial Korea under Japanese rule and in postcolonial North 
Korea. In the following I will attempt to highlight both the similarities and the quite important 
differences between the two periods and then use that comparison to shed some light on the broader 
question of twentieth century proletarianisation in the developing world. First though, it should be 
stressed that while the colonial Japanese regime and the DPRK state had much in common in 
political economic terms, they were not in any sense equivalent political regimes. The fact that one 
state was founded on imperialism, racism and exploitation while the other claimed to be a 
government of national liberation ruling in the interests of the Korean masses was not simply a 
matter of ideology. These differences in political orientation had significant effects in the 'real 
world' on the behaviour of leaders, bureaucrats and the mass of people who were their subjects. 
That is to say, it is likely that many Koreans in 1950s North Korea felt they had a stake in the 
country and its future and wished to contribute to its defence and its postwar recovery. This 
difference does need to be borne in mind when we assess the coerciveness of labour mobilisation 
under the two regimes. The different historical context of the two regimes also requires some 
attention. Most importantly, once the Soviet Union had occupied northern Korea in 1945 it was in a 
position to impose many of its labour policies on the territory, and the influence of Stalin-era Soviet 
labour management would continue in the DPRK for many years. Thus, as in many areas of society, 
labour policy and the processes of proletarianisation in North Korea reveal a complex mixture of 
influences from the Japanese colonial period and the USSR.lxxiv 
Perhaps the most prominent similarity between the types of mobilisation used in colonial and 
postcolonial North Korea was the use of a state-directed wartime labour conscription system in 
order to get the required workers for key industries or construction projects. Obviously a key 
difference lay in the fact that under Japanese state-directed wartime capitalism workers were by and 
large conscripted by the state to work for private companies, while under the DPRK's bureaucratic 
state capitalism both recruitment and employment was done by the state as all enterprises were 
state-owned. In both cases there were also more temporary forms of labour mobilisation through 
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semi-official social organisations such as the Patriotic Units of colonial Korea and the mass 
organisations of the DPRK such as the Democratic Youth League and the Korean Workers' Party. 
In terms of where the new workers came from there were both similarities and differences. In both 
colonial Korea and postcolonial North Korea the primary source of new workers was undoubtedly 
the peasant class and particularly young men from rural areas. While there were often significant 
push factors driving this section of the population to seek work in the new industries and in cities, 
the severe labour shortages experienced in both periods demonstrate that such factors did not 
convince enough young men to leave their villages and families behind. Coercion directed against 
the rural population was therefore seen as a necessity in both colonial and postcolonial Korea. But 
in the postwar DPRK there was a further factor that seems to have been creating a surplus 
population in rural areas: the programme of collectivisation that was carried out in the mid 1950s. 
This is a good demonstration of the more comprehensive power of the state in North Korea, as it 
was able to both directly conscript new workers and consciously create the conditions under which 
they were no longer required in the agricultural sector. 
In the gendering of proletarianisation there was also a notable difference between colonial Korea 
and the DPRK. Large numbers of women were mobilised by the Japanese state during wartime for 
various kinds of work – most infamously for forced military prostitution – but they were not 
mobilised in large numbers to work in industry and the industrial workforce of late colonial Korea 
actually became more masculine as the proportion of heavy industry rose. By contrast, under North 
Korea's wartime and postwar mobilisation women became a crucial segment of the population 
mobilised for industrial work. Whereas the Japanese turned to Korean men to replace Japanese men 
who had been sent to fight at the front, the DPRK state had little choice but to turn to Korean 
women to replace the Korean men who had joined the KPA during the Korean War. This wartime 
and postwar trend in North Korea was driven by both desperate need, due to a severe shortage of 
working age men, and by the ideology of the DPRK that strongly asserted the equality of women in 
many areas of public life.lxxv Another source of new workers used extensively by the North Korean 
state after the Korean War was demobbed soldiers, who transitioned from wartime military 
mobilisation to peacetime industrial deployment. This was a source of labourers that had not been 
available to the Japanese authorities. 
The process of proletarianisation did not end with the recruitment of workers to new industrial jobs. 
Both states faced the problem of labour mobility; essentially a form of passive resistance on the part 
of workers who voted with their feet when tired of poor conditions or pay. Thus the Japanese 
colonial state and the DPRK sought ways to fix Korean workers in their positions and prevent them 
from either moving to other workplaces or returning to their villages and families. And in both cases 
the solutions were quite similar: they legislated to prevent workers from leaving their workplaces 
and introduced bureaucratic measures – in the form of labour passports – to restrict their mobility 
and gather data on all workers under the purview of the state. In fact in this particular area there 
seems to be very little difference between the approach of the two states and, while it is certain that 
the DPRK approach to this issue was heavily influenced by Soviet labour law, it is quite possible 
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that some influence also came from practices of the late Japanese colonial period. What is different 
is that while the fixing of workers in position was a form of wartime conscription under Japanese 
rule, under the DPRK it only became fully established in law after the end of the Korean War, thus 
making it a 'normal' rather than 'extraordinary' mode of state-labour relations. Disciplining as well 
as immobilising the newly-formed workforce was also a common concern of the state in both 
periods examined here, but this topic is beyond the scope of this article. 
In Korea during the period from the start of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937 to the end of the first 
five-year plan in 1960, a large proportion, possibly even an outright majority, of those who became 
industrial workers did so through the intervention of the state. This was true across two very 
different political regimes because the political economies of both these regimes were characterised 
by states that either dominated and directed capital or took its place entirely. The tendency towards 
state capitalism, in its different forms, was extremely widespread in the mid-twentieth century and it 
should not be surprising that otherwise disparate polities should develop similar political-economic 
structures, especially when we bear in mind that state capitalism was advancing even in industrially 
developed European countries such as Britain. But two other factors were at work in Korea during 
this period. First, both the colonial Japanese regime and the DPRK state were practising accelerated 
catch-up development in northern Korea and direct state intervention was particularly well suited to 
this sort of development. And second, both regimes were involved in fighting 'total wars' which 
required mobilisation of the entire population. War then, became the crucial factor in both cases that 
cemented state control of the economy and motivated the very direct state intervention in the 
process of creating a new working class. 
Marx had already recognised in Capital that the state and coercion were part and parcel of the 
creation of the working class during the “historic genesis of capitalism”, but the implication in his 
work was that this would sooner or later give way to “the dull compulsion of economic relations”. 
Now, there is ample evidence to argue that proletarianisation has never been a “natural” process led 
by the expansion of capitalist markets, but rather a process in which the state plays a key role in all 
societies. Moreover, in mid-twentieth-century developing countries like Korea, wracked by 
imperialism and total war, the role of the state in proletarianisation would turn out to be far more 
far-reaching and long-lasting than Marx could have imagined when he was writing in the mid 
nineteenth century.lxxvi Comparing the case of Korea to other newly-industrialising countries during 
the same historical period will no doubt provide rich material for further developing our 
understanding of proletarianisation under conditions of late development. 
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